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MORALITY, MARRIAGE, AND MOROC-
CO: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF EX-
TRA-MARITAL RELATIONS IN RABAT 
The sultry storylines of worldwide soap 
operas and movies often tell torrid tales of 
men and women moonlighting outside of their 
relationships. While much of society considers 
adultery objectionable, governments typically 
view the actions of two consenting adults as 
private and not criminal. In Morocco, however, 
perfidy could be a path to prison. The Moroc-
can law on adultery, combined with an alleged-
ly unfair court system, has caught the attention 
of human rights defenders. According to a 
Human Rights Watch report, a recent crimi-
nal prosecution of adultery reflects Morocco's 
failure to respect the fundamental rights to fair 
trial and privacy guaranteed in its 2011 Consti-
tution, and under Article 14 (right to fair trial) 
and Article 17 (right to privacy) of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), which Morocco ratified in 1979. 
In April 2015, a Moroccan court sen-
tenced Hicham Mansouri, age 34, along with 
his female companion, age 30, to ten months 
in prison for adultery. On May 27, 2015, the 
Appeals Chamber of the Rabat Court of First 
Instance confirmed the verdict without consid-
ering evidence that placed significant doubt on 
the creditability of the police report. Addition-
ally, Human Rights Watch expressed concern 
as to whether the prosecution of Mansouri for 
adultery was politically motivated by his status 
as a journalist with the Moroccan Association 
for Investigative Journalism, an organization 
whose activities, according to some sources, 
the government has "systematically blocked:' 
Freedom of press remains limited in Mo-
rocco. The government tightly controls tele-
vision and journalists are at risk of imprison-
ment for criticizing the monarchy. As of 2015, 
Morocco is ranked 130th out of 180 countries 
in the Reporters Without Borders Press Free-
dom Index. According to critics, despite the 
promises of reform by King Mohammed VI of 
Morocco in light of the Arab Spring uprisings, 
Moroccan citizens have not yet fully realized 
fundamental freedoms. 
Mansouri's prosecution has also raised 
questions about the fairness of Morocco's 
judicial proceedings. According to Reporters 
Without Borders, after arresting Mansouri 
without a warrant, police undressed him and 
then began beating him. He was also deprived 
of access to his lawyers within the first twen-
ty-four hours of his arrest. According to the 
2014 Report of the United Nations (UN) Work-
ing Group on Arbitrary Detention, Section 
66 of Morocco's Code of Criminal Procedure 
allows a detainee to access a lawyer during the 
first twenty-four hours of arrest only "upon 
the authorization of the Prosecutor's Office, for 
only thirty minutes and in the presence of an 
investigator:' 
Also, at Mansouri's trial, the judge refused 
to hear defense witnesses. Another Human 
Rights Watch report, examining the prosecu-
tion of six criminal cases between 2008 and 
2013, found strong evidence of unfair trial pro-
ceedings in Morocco. According to the report, 
the use of confessions forced from defendants 
by police officers served as a main justification 
for the convictions. It also found that the judg-
es failed to investigate claims by defendants 
that the government forced them, sometimes 
through torture or falsification, to confess to 
their crimes, including fraud and terrorism. 
The report concluded that the courts' lack of 
oversight and investigation encouraged law en-
forcement personnel to use coercive measures 
to obtain confessions from potentially innocent 
defendants. 
Rights groups claim the case of Mansouri 
is clear evidence of Morocco's failure to fully 
respect the fundamental rights guaranteed 
under the ICCPR, including the right to pri-
vacy, freedom of expression, and the right to 
fair trial. The United Nations Working Group 
on Discrimination Against Women in Law 
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and Practice condemns the criminalization 
of adultery. It notes that when courts punish 
adultery, they often do so disproportionately 
against women. While acknowledging that in 
some cultures, adultery may be a ground for 
civil actions, the group stresses that it should 
never be a criminal offense punishable by fines, 
incarceration, flogging, or death. 
Rights groups believe that if Morocco is 
not living up to its human rights obligations, 
including guaranteeing the rights to privacy, 
freedom of expression, and fair trial, it should 
move swiftly to implement necessary reforms. 
The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Juan 
E. Mendez, has recommended the country 
"monitor penalty enforcement and verify its 
validity;' and "strengthen the right to appeal for 
those affected by disciplinary measures:' Other 
rights experts have called for the end of laws 
criminalizing adultery because of their dispro-
portionate impact on women. Finally, many 
believe King Mohammed should resume the 
political reforms he promised in 2011. 
By Andrew F. Mutavdzija, staff writer 
SAUDI ARABIA AND ITS ROLE 
IN THE UNITED NATIONS HU-
MAN RIGHTS COUNCIL 
In late September 2015, the United Nations 
(UN) Human Rights Council and Saudi Arabia 
came under scrutiny for electing the Kingdom's 
UN Permanent Representative Faisal Bin Has-
san Trad to the Council's Consultative Group, 
which is in charge of proposing a list of inde-
pendent human rights experts. This criticism 
comes two years after Saudi Arabia's highly 
contentious election to the Council, in which 
allegations arose that it traded promises and 
financial support with the United Kingdom 
in exchange for mutual support in its bids to 
secure membership to the Council. 
The most prominent aspect of the recent 
criticism facing Saudi Arabia and the Council 
is the apparent disconnect between electing 
a representative from a country with a long 
history of human rights violations to such a 
key position in the U.N. body responsible for 
monitoring human rights across the world. 
Critics cite Saudi Arabia's sentencing of 
Raif Badawi to 1000 lashes for blogging about 
free speech and its indiscriminate attacks on 
civilians during the recent military coalition 
against Houthi rebels in Yemen as the two 
recent examples of human rights violations. 
Furthermore, on September 9, 2015, Amnesty 
International submitted a report to the Coun-
cil detailing grave concerns over Saudi Arabia's 
justice system, such as passing death penalty 
sentences without sufficient legal safeguards. 
Under Paragraph 47 of the Annex to Hu-
man Rights Council Resolution 5/1, the Con-
sultative Group must "propose to the President, 
at least one month before the beginning of the 
session in which the Council would consider 
the selection of mandate-holders, a list of can-
didates who possess the highest qualifications 
for the mandates in question and meet the 
general criteria and particular requirements:' 
Mandate-holders, also called special rappor-
teurs, are independent human rights experts 
who "report and advise on human rights from 
a thematic or country-specific perspective:' 
While Paragraph 39 of the resolution con-
siders the general criteria of independence, 
impartiality, and objectivity as "of paramount 
importance" in nominating, selecting, and ap-
pointing mandate-holders, there are concerns 
that Saudi Arabia's appointment runs counter 
to the Council's creation in 2006 to replace the 
widely-criticized UN Human Rights Com-
mission. Hillel Neuer, the Executive Director 
of UN Watch organization, also criticized the 
appointment, calling it "scandalous" as the 
country has "beheaded more people this year 
than ISIS:' Ensaf Haidar, blogger Raif Badawi's 
wife, described the appointment as "a green 
light" for Saudi Arabia to start flogging her 
husband again. 
In response to mounting criticism, the 
Council issued a press release on September 24, 
2015, describing the condemnation as "a highly 
distorted narrative:' It emphasized that the 
Consultative Group is comprised of five am-
bassadors "who are not elected by the Human 
Rights Council, or any other UN body, but 
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appointed by the five regional groups and serve 
in their personal capacitY:' It also refuted the 
suggestion that an ambassador can unilaterally 
select a mandate-holder, calling it "patently un-
true:' This allays concerns over Saudi Arabia's 
position in the Council and the Consultative 
Group, but it does little to assuage concern that 
politics are undermining the Council's stated 
purpose. The UN General Assembly Resolution 
60/251, which established the Council, states 
that the organ should be focused on addressing 
human rights violations and that it should do 
so in a non-politicized system. 
Contrary to those criticisms, the U.S. De-
partment of State's Deputy Spokesperson Mark 
Toner said that the U.S. "would welcome" the 
appointment. In his statement, Toner took the 
position that while the U.S. government con-
tinues to support Saudi Arabia, there would be 
a strong dialogue whenever human rights con-
cerns arise. He further expressed hope that the 
leadership position would be "an occasion for 
[Saudi Arabia] to look at human rights around 
the world also within [its] own borders:' 
While Saudi Arabia's appointment to the 
Council has raised concerns in the internation-
al community, UN leaders have argued against 
the notion that the Council will regress to the 
behavior that typified the ineffective Human 
Rights Commission. As Secretary General Kofi 
Annan stated in an address to the Commis-
sion, the Council will be "be more accountable 
and more representative" than its predecessor. 
However, he also stated, "The Council will not 
overcome all the tensions that accompany our 
handling of human rights [because a] degree 
of tension is inherent in the issues:' Some of 
the tension with the Saudis is a product of 
the competing goals of holding the country 
accountable for its violations in some areas of 
human rights while acknowledging its progress 
in others. Such progress, while slow, is present 
in Saudi Arabia, with previous Saudi King Ab-
dullah appointing thirty women to the Shura 
Council and giving women the right to vote 
and participate in municipal elections begin-
ning this year. Although there are fears that the 
new king, Salman bin Abdulaziz, is slowing 
progress, the country's leadership position in 
the Council may serve as a signpost indicating 
not only recognition of human rights progress, 
but also an increased responsibility to uphold 
human rights. 
KUWAIT'S RECENT EFFORTS 
IN RECOGNIZING THE RIGHTS 
OF DOMESTIC WORKERS 
On June 24, 2015, Kuwait passed legislation 
to promote the rights of over 660,000 migrant 
workers within its borders, seeking to address 
the abuses that many of those individuals face. 
The legislation comes five years after the gov-
ernment passed Law No. 6 on labor law in the 
private sector, which specifically left the rights 
of domestic workers out. Although the new 
legislation falls short of the standards under 
the International Labor Organization's (ILO) 
Domestic Workers Convention, many consider 
it the most progressive piece of domestic work-
ers' labor law among the Gulf States. 
Kuwait's recent legislation signals an aware-
ness of the criticism that the Gulf States have 
been facing due to their failure to prevent and 
redress well-documented abuse of domestic 
workers. According to Kuwait's 2015 Univer-
sal Periodical Review submitted to the United 
Nations (UN) Human Rights Council, foreign 
workers amount "to more than two-thirds of 
the population, representing more than 164 
different nationalities;' many of whom per-
form domestic work. The abuse of domestic 
workers is frequently attributed to the kafala 
sponsorship system, which grants employ-
ers "substantial control over workers:' Under 
this system, practiced by the majority of Gulf 
States, a migrant worker's sponsor directly 
controls his immigration status and freedom 
to change employment for the duration of the 
employment contract. Such a framework is 
contrary to Article 3 of the Domestic Workers 
Convention, which calls on the States Parties to 
respect, promote, and realize domestic workers' 
"freedom of association and the effective recog-
nition of the right to collective bargaining" and 
to eliminate "all forms of forced or compulsory 
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[labor]:' Kuwait has yet to ratify the Conven-
tion. According to the Migrant Forum in Asia, 
the kafala system "often leads to the securitiza-
tion of migrants should they attempt to chal-
lenge its restrictions or escape from abuse and 
exploitation:' In response, the ILO Committee 
of Experts in 2014 urged the government of 
Kuwait to ensure that its labor laws do not 
"place or maintain the workers concerned in a 
situation of increased vulnerability to discrim -
ination and abuse, as a result of disproportion-
ate power exercised by the employer over the 
worker:' 
A 2010 Human Rights Watch Report doc-
umented some of those abuses which included 
the non-payment of wages, long working hours 
with little or no rest, physical and sexual abuse, 
and no judicial venues to seek legal redress. Re-
cently, those abuses prompted India's Ministry 
of External Affairs to issue a statement regard-
ing the treatment of the 90,000 Indian work-
ers in Kuwait, warning others to be careful in 
seeking employment in the country. 
While a number of other Gulf States, in-
cluding Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, have joined 
Kuwait in adopting similar legislative measures 
on domestic workers' rights in order to mit-
igate the abusive system of kafala, Qatar, the 
United Arab Emirates, and Oman continue to 
completely omit domestic workers from their 
labor-related protective laws. However, there 
are indications that Kuwait's efforts have begun 
a move towards progress, with the United Arab 
Emirates enacting an initiative to protect mi-
grant workers which will take effect in January 
2016. While this initiative will not address 
domestic workers' rights in particular, it will 
allow migrant workers to seek more effective 
means of addressing situations in which they 
lack compensation, suffer abuse, or wish to 
terminate their employment. 
While Kuwait's new legislation seems to 
represent a positive step, the country still 
retains the kafala system. Another significant 
concern about the law is its existing ambigui-
ty that can adversely affect migrant domestic 
workers. Despite the fact that the legislation 
provides a number of previously nonexistent 
protections, it is unclear how this informa -
tion will reach uninformed workers or those 
currently living in abusive situations. Further-
more, even if workers are aware of the safe-
guards, it is unclear what legal venues they will 
have to report violations of the new legislation. 
Despite its shortcomings, the law reflects 
Kuwait's effort to stand by its ratification of 
the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights by enacting what 
will be the most progressive legislation in the 
Gulf States on the rights of domestic workers. 
Although it may not rise to the standards set 
forth by the ILO, it will afford domestic work-
ers significant protections, such as a twelve-
hour working day, a day off once a week, thir-
ty-day paid leave, and overtime pay. There is 
still work for the Kuwaiti Parliament to take in 
ensuring the dignity of domestic workers, but 
its most recent legislation signals not only the 
willingness, but also an initiative to ensure that 
the country's domestic workers equally enjoy 
the fundamental human rights, particularly the 
freedom of movement and compensation for 
work performed. 
By Isaac Morales, staff writer 
HOLDING THE FREE SYRIAN 
ARMY ACCOUNTABLE FOR ITS 
USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS 
Over the past four years, the Free Syrian 
Army, a coalition of non-state militias, has 
been fighting against both the Assad regime 
and Islamic extremist groups. Recently, hu-
man rights groups have criticized the army for 
its use of child soldiers. Even amidst severe 
human rights abuses committed by its rivals, 
the Free Syrian Army is not exempt from 
accountability. The Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict 
obligates its States Parties to "take all feasi-
ble measures" to prevent armed groups from 
recruiting or using children under the age of 
eighteen in hostilities. The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) makes 
it a war crime to "conscript or enlist children 
4
Human Rights Brief, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/vol22/iss2/5
under the age of fifteen years into the national 
armed forces or using them to participate ac-
tively in hostilities:' The Additional Protocol II 
to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 also stress-
es that "children who have not attained the age 
of fifteen years shall neither be recruited in the 
armed forces ... nor allowed to take part in 
hostilities:' The critical question here is wheth-
er any of the three treaties can help hold the 
Free Syrian Army accountable for its actions, 
given its status as a non-state actor. 
According to its 2014 report, Human 
Rights Watch interviewed Syrian boys and 
girls as young as fourteen years of age who 
acknowledged joining and assisting the Free 
Syrian Army with a range of different duties 
such as carrying supplies, loading ammuni-
tion, informing on enemy movements, or even 
fighting on the frontlines. While factions and 
affiliates of the Free Syrian Army have entered 
into agreements to eliminate the enlistment of 
children into their ranks, leaders within those 
entities told Human Rights Watch that the 
practice continues. 
In October 2013, the Syrian government 
ratified the Optional Protocol to the Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child on the 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict. 
It declared that it does not "permit any person 
under [eighteen] years of age to join the active 
armed forces:' While the prosecution of al-
leged violations of the protocol is theoretically 
in the hands of the government, the nature 
of the ongoing civil war precludes the regime 
from exercising this power over the Free Syrian 
Army. In addition, the international commu-
nity has strongly condemned the regime for its 
gross human rights violations, including its use 
of children in hostilities. As such, the Assad re-
gime does not seem to be in a position to hold 
the Free Syrian Army accountable. 
Another avenue to justice, the Rome 
Statute, imposes individual criminal responsi-
bility on war criminals. Pursuant to its Article 
25, a natural person is criminally responsible, 
if he or she commits an enumerated crime, 
"whether as an individual, jointly with anoth-
er or through another person:' Under Article 
12, however, in order for the ICC to exercise 
its jurisdiction over an individual who is not a 
national of a State Party, the country concerned 
must first accept the ICC's jurisdiction over the 
conduct at issue. As Syria is not a party to the 
Rome Statute, and as the international com-
munity has already accused its armed forces 
of a slew of atrocities, it seems highly unlikely 
Syria will invite the ICC to prosecute its rebel 
groups. 
A third option, Article 6 of the Additional 
Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, calls 
for the prosecution and punishment of crim-
inal offenses occurring in non-international 
armed conflicts, including the recruitment of 
children under the age of fifteen by non-gov-
ernment forces. In fact, Article 8(2)(e) of the 
Rome Statute implicitly refers to this measure; 
it considers the act of "[c]onscripting or en-
listing children under the age of fifteen years 
into armed forces or groups or using them to 
participate actively in hostilities" as a serious 
violation "of the laws and customs applicable in 
armed conflicts not of an international charac-
ter:' Furthermore, according to a study con-
ducted by the International Committee of the 
Red Cross, the prohibition against the recruit-
ment of children in hostilities "is a norm of 
customary international law applicable in both 
international and non-international armed 
conflicts:' However, the ongoing civil war in 
Syria coupled with alleged gross human rights 
violations by the Assad regime and extremist 
militia groups makes the prospect of holding 
the Free Syrian Army accountable in the near 
future a remote one. 
As the civil war continues to devastate 
Syria, human rights organizations will continue 
to document gross violations on all sides of the 
conflict. But it is critical for the future of any 
post-war nation to hold accountable the per-
petuators of gross human rights violations and 
to recognize the power of international human 
rights and humanitarian law in doing so. 
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PALESTINIAN CHILD LABOR 
IN ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS 
In November of 2015, the European Com-
mission issued new guidelines related to goods 
made in Israeli settlements. The Commission 
reiterated the European Union's position of not 
recognizing Israel's sovereignty over the occu-
pied territories, including the Golan Heights, 
the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and East Jeru-
salem, under international law. In response to 
a demand for clarity as to the source of prod-
ucts from the areas annexed by Israel, the new 
guidelines require the goods to have labels stat-
ing the word "settlement" and the geographical 
origins of the products. But one crucial issue 
lost in the discussion of the product-labeling 
regulations is the employment of hundreds of 
Palestinian children in Israeli settlements. 
In April 2015, Human Rights Watch pub-
lished a seventy-eight-page report detailing the 
employment of Palestinian children in Israeli 
settlements, particularly in the agricultural 
sector. It documents "rights abuses against Pal-
estinian children as young as [eleven] years old 
who earn around $19 for a full day of working 
in the settlement agricultural industrY:' It also 
finds many children do not attend school and 
work in hazardous conditions with pesticides 
and dangerous equipment. Some children 
interviewed described "vomiting, dizziness, 
and skin rashes after spraying pesticides with 
little protection, and experienced body pain 
or numbness from carrying heavy pesticide 
containers on their back:' 
While the dispute over the occupied ter-
ritories and Israel's annexation of the West 
Bank remains a highly contested issue both 
domestically and internationally, the respect 
for the rights of the child, including the prohi-
bition of child labor, is well settled. Article 32 
of the United Nations (UN) Convention on the 
Rights of the Child ( CRC), to which Israel is 
a party, requires states to "recognize the right 
of the child to be protected from economic 
exploitation and from performing any work 
that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere 
with the child's education, or to be harmful to 
the child's health or physical, mental, spiritual, 
moral or social development:' The provision 
also mandates that states establish a minimum 
age of child employment along with appropri-
ate hours and proper work conditions. In 1998, 
the Israeli government amended the country's 
Youth Employment Law in an effort to im-
plement the CRC. The law prohibits the em-
ployment of children under the age of fifteen. 
It also forbids children from work that would 
adversely affect their physical, mental, and edu-
cational development, including "potentially 
hazardous mechanical, physical, chemical, and 
biological elements:' Yet the Human Rights 
Watch report indicates that Israel has failed to 
equally apply the law to Palestinian children 
working in the settlements. The CRC Commit-
tee, in its 2013 Concluding Observations on 
Israel, highlighted the government's "persistent 
refusal to provide data and to respond to the 
Committee's written questions on children 
living in the [occupied territories] :' 
Furthermore, Article 10 of the Internation-
al Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) imposes a similar obligation 
on Israel. It underscores that " [ c] hildren and 
young persons should be protected from eco-
nomic and social exploitation. Their employ-
ment in work harmful to their morals or health 
or dangerous to life or likely to hamper their 
normal development should be punishable by 
law:' According to Human Rights Watch, twen-
ty-one of the children who were working full-
time on the farms had dropped out of school 
in tenth grade or earlier. Schoolteachers and 
administrators told Human Rights Watch that 
many students drop out to work in the settle-
ments. Under impoverished conditions, severe-
ly restricted access to water, and with limited 
agricultural development in the West Bank, 
Palestinian families often permit their children 
to work for settler-employers who pay them 
well below the minimum wage for minors in 
Israel in order to help support the family. In 
its last Concluding Observations of 2011, the 
I CESCR Committee particularly recommend-
ed the Israeli government "intensify its efforts 
to lower the high dropout rate for Arab Israeli 
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and Bedouin children:' 
Israel is also a State party to the Minimum 
Age Convention of the International Labour 
Organization (ILO). Pursuant to Article 2 of 
the Convention, the minimum age of employ-
ment "shall not be less than the age of comple-
tion of compulsory schooling and, in any case, 
shall not be less than [fifteen] years:' In addi-
tion, under Article 3, "The minimum age for 
admission to any type of employment ... likely 
to jeopard[ize] the health, safety or morals of 
young persons shall not be less than [eighteen] 
years:' Article 7, however, allows the employ-
ment of minors between the ages of thirteen to 
fifteen on "light work'' that would not adversely 
affect their health and educational develop-
ment. In 2012, the ILO Committee requested 
the Israeli government "take the necessary 
measures to bring its national practice into 
conformity with the Convention by permitting 
employment in light work only for children 
who have reached the age of [fourteen] years:' 
While the overarching issue remains the le-
gality of the Israeli settlements in the occupied 
territories, violations of international child 
labor laws raise serious human rights con-
cerns. Under the relevant international treaties, 
the financial hardship of Palestinian families 
does not give license for allowing children to 
work in a way that would adversely affect their 
health and educational development. 
By David Weinstein, staff writer 
IRANIAN WOMEN'S RIGHT TO 
WORK IN PUBLIC SECTOR 
According to rights groups, Iranian women 
have been taking two-steps forward and one 
step back in their push for equality, particularly 
the right to equal employment opportunities 
and to hold public office. Prior to the 1979 Is-
lamic Revolution, women could serve as judg-
es, elected representatives to the Iranian Parlia-
ments, and even members of the Cabinet. But 
when Iranians took to the streets in opposition 
to the Pahlavi Dynasty, women saw the future 
of Iran as even more promising. Young female 
students in particular viewed the Shah's regime 
as a monarchy heavily influenced by Western 
Powers that had no tolerance towards alterna-
tive political parties or ideologies. The Islamic 
Revolution was indeed a message of change for 
many Iranian women. Yet soon after Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini became Supreme Leader 
of the country, the hope for more civil liberties 
quickly dissipated, particularly the evolution of 
women's right to equal employment opportu-
nities. 
The existing legal framework of the Islamic 
Republic may deny women the ability to hold 
high decision-making positions. Under Iran's 
Constitution, many of those positions are 
"exclusively tailored for Shi'ite fuqaha (jurists) 
and mujtahids (Islamic jurists who are capable 
of an independent derivation of Islamic rules 
from the primary sources):' For example, Arti-
cle 99 of the Constitution gives Iran's Guardian 
Council the authority to supervise the elections 
of "the Assembly of Experts for Leadership, the 
President of the Republic, the Islamic Consul-
tative Assembly [Parliament], and the direct 
recourse to popular opinion and referenda:' 
The Law No. 1234of1991 interpreted that pro-
vision to give the Council a sweeping power to 
monitor public elections, including the rigor-
ous process of vetting candidates. According to 
Majlis Monitor, an Iranian watchdog organiza-
tion, " [ t] his aggressive vetting, which at times 
has prevented entire political groups from 
running in elections, persists today and has 
been a cornerstone of continued conservative 
dominance of Iran's parliament:' This process 
in effect has barred many women candidates 
from participating in the decision-making 
process of the country. Although Article 115 of 
the Constitution does not expressly bar worn -
en from running for president, the Council 
in 2004 declared that it "has not changed its 
interpretation of Article 115 and women still 
may not be elected as President:' According to 
the United Nations Statistics Division, since 
1997, Iranian women have held less than five 
percent of parliamentary seats. Specifically, 
during the course of nine parliamentary terms, 
out of2700 members of Parliament, only sev-
enty-three were women. 
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Women's right to participate in Iran's judi-
ciary system is also limited. Although women 
may acquire a legal education, the existing laws 
bar them from serving as judges. Under Arti-
cle 163 oflran's Constitution, the conditions 
and qualifications to serve as a judge must be 
in accordance with "the criteria of fiqh [Sha-
ria law or Islamic law]:' Soon after the 1979 
Revolution, conservative clerics made a series 
of religious pronouncements removing worn -
en, including Shirin Ebadi, the recipient of the 
2013 Nobel Peace Prize, from their positions as 
judges. While an amendment to the Process of 
Appointment of Judges Act of 1982 recognized 
the possibility of women "as counselors and in -
vestigators;' the role of judicial decision-mak-
ing continues to remain exclusively with men. 
Iran has ratified multiple international trea-
ties relevant to women's rights. It is currently 
a State Party to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the In-
ternational Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Under Article 25 of 
the ICCPR, every citizen "shall have the right 
and the opportunity ... without unreasonable 
restrictions: (a) to take part in the conduct of 
public affairs, directly or through freely cho-
sen representatives; [and] (b) to vote and to be 
elected at genuine periodic elections:' Similarly, 
Article 6 of ICESCR calls on States Parties to 
recognize "the right to work, which includes 
the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain 
his living by work which he freely chooses or 
accepts:' 
In response to Iran's third periodic report 
on the implementation of the ICCPR, the 
Human Rights Committee expressly requested 
Iran explain why the country continues to ex-
clude women from decision-making positions 
including the Guardian Council, the Expedien-
cy Council, and the judiciary. The government 
of Iran replied to the Committee by claiming 
that "there is no gender limit stipulated for 
membership on the Guardian Council and the 
Expediency Council:' With respect to judicial 
opportunity for women, it provided statistics 
indicating that in 2003, "there were exactly 
161 women judges and 4 women deputies of 
Judicial Complexes:' According to Iran Human 
Rights Documentation Center, however, the 
"so-called women 'judges' [were] not permitted 
to make substantial decisions in any case;' and 
none of the 100 branches of General and Revo-
lutionary Courts included a female judge. 
While Iran's existing legal framework 
continues to hinder women's participation in 
the county's decision-making process, rights 
groups and international organizations believe 
that by amending current laws, the government 
can still take positive steps in realizing the 
equal rights of Iranian women promised thir-
ty-six years ago when the Islamic Revolution 
took place. 
By Jessica Lee McKenney, staff writer 
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